CIVIL LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF NASD RULES:
SEC v. FIRST SECURITIES CO.
In a recent case, SEC v. First Securities Co.,' the Seventh Circuit
held a brokerage firm liable for damages incurred by clients as a result
of its failure to inspect and review the business correspondence of an
employee. This failure was a violation of section 27 of the National
Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice. 2
"Such violations provide a basis for private damage actions where the
rule violated serves to protect the public," 3 said the court. The decision
is the first by a federal court to hold an NASD member liable in a
civil action for violation of an NASD rule.
This Comment will analyze the Seventh Circuit's basis for finding civil liability in First Securities and other related cases. This theory
will be compared to that suggested by the Second Circuit, and will be
evaluated with regard particularly to its impact upon the NASD's
increasingly litigated4 suitability rule.5 Broadly read, the Seventh
Circuit's approach' would appear to impose federal civil liability for
violation of any NASD Rules of Fair Practice whereas the Second
Circuit 7 would differentiate between ethical standards of professional
service and rules designed to prevent fraud. The latter would appear
the more valuable approach, for it enables the federal courts either
to decline to extend civil liability for violation of professional ethical
standards, or to create liability with the full awareness that they are
adopting mere standards of professional conduct which require considerable development.
I.

TiE First Securities

DECISION

Leston B. Nay, President of First Securities and owner of 92%
of its stock, convinced several of the firm's regular clients to invest in
an "escrow." The funds invested were to serve as the principal for a
1 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 93,430 (7th Cir., Apr. 12,
1972).
2
CCH NASD MAxuAL fI 2177. Rule 27 provides in part:
(a) Each member shall establish, maintain and enforce written procedures
which will enable it to supervise properly the activities of each registered representative and associated person to assure compliance with applicable securities
laws, rules, regulations and statements of policy promulgated thereunder and
with the rules of this Association.
3 [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f[ 93,430, at 92,139.
4 For a discussion of one pending case brought under the suitability rule, see Belliveau,
Discretion or Indiscretion, INsT. INv., Aug. 1972, at 65.
5CCH NASD rIAruAr art. III, § 2, II 2152.
6See, e.g., Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1969). Cf. Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 838 (1969).
7See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
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small loan company which would lend at interest rates up to 2Y2 % per
month. Annual returns on this special opportunity were promised to
be in the vicinity of 9 to 12%. Clients thus sold other securities
through the brokerage firm in order to obtain the necessary cash to
invest in the escrow.
The dealings were not conducted, however, in the manner typical
of the company. Nay acknowledged the claimants' investments by
means of a handwritten document. He used his personal checks to
make interest payments and deducted these payments from his personal income for tax purposes. Over the course of fifteen years the
payments became less regular, until it was revealed that the firm was
bankrupt and the escrow nonexistent. The SEC instituted a receivership action and the clients sought to recover against the assets of the
company. It was established that the firm had no actual knowledge
of its president's fraudulent activity and had granted no actual authority to him to conduct the escrow dealings. Significantly, however,
the company did enforce a rule that no mail addressed to the president
was to be opened by any other employee. The district court dismissed
the claims.
In reversing the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held the firm liable under four different theories:
the apparent authority of the president to deal in the escrow, under
common law agency;" the "controlling person status" of the firm with
respect to its employee, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;0
the "aiding and abetting" position assumed by the firm in its failure to
check the president's correspondence under rule 10b-5 of the SEC;' 0
and the violation of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice," mentioned
above. This Comment concentrates on the last of the claims recognized,
and specifically the standard the court employed in finding a private
cause of action for the violation of an NASD rule.
The first case to deal specifically with the issue of whether a
8 RsTATEmET (SEcoND) OP AGENcy §§ 261, 262 (1958).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1970).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972). The court held that aiding and abetting may be
founded on less than actual knowledge and participation in the activity proscribed by
rule 10b-5. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f1 93,430, at 92,139.
Although the opinion might be read to reject a scienter requirement, the court did
stress the firm's recklessness in enforcing the president's order not to open his mail. Id.
Such abandon may satisfy the scienter requirement traditionally associated with aiding
and abetting. Reckless disregard for the truth of representations made by a co-participant
in the course of common activity may be legally equivalent to a knowing assistance in
fraud. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L.
REV. 597, 630-38 (1972). Cf. Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757
(D. Colo. 1964). For a case suggesting that the Seventh Circuit might demand something
less than scienter, see Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
1359, 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (holding that a claim for relief

based on aiding and abetting securities fraud is stated if it is alleged that the defendant
knew or should have known of fraudulent activity and enabled that activity to continue).
11 CCH NASD M wuAL art. III, § 27, ff 2177.
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brokerage firm could be held liable in a private cause of action for a
violation of an SEC or NASD rule was Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache
& Co.' 2 There the plaintiff claimed that defendant, Bache, a New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) member, breached an oral agreement
by requiring margin in excess of the minimum requirements of the
NYSE and that as a result of Bache's demands it suffered losses,
"running into millions of dollars, and some $100,000 in commissions
which Bache had collected." 3 Under the NYSE constitution, a member who is found guilty of "conduct or proceeding inconsistent with
just and equitable principles of trade may . . . be suspended or ex-

pelled."' 4 The plaintiff believed that the breach of the oral agreement
violated such "just and equitable principles of trade" which were
referred to not only in the NYSE constitution but also in other statutory regulations.' 5
The lower court dismissed the federal claim indicating that violation of association exchange rules does not give rise to suits in federal
courts. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision, but only after carefully analyzing the rule and creating a test which requires a judicial
investigation of the particular rule involved with regard to its function
in securities regulation. Pursuant to this, "a court must look to the
nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme,
with the party urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a
considerably heavier burden of persuasion than when the violation is of
the statute or an SEC regulation."'"
In essence, the Second Circuit expressed its belief that the principle of Baird v. Franklin"--thatfailure by a stock exchange to enforce
rules adopted pursuant to section 6(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 could give rise to a federal claim against the exchange by
an investor-should not necessarily be extended to allow the injured
investor to sue a member of the self-regulatory body for the latter's
failure to conform to such rules. While mentioning several tests to be
used in finding the existence of a private cause of action under NASD
rules, the court declared two general criteria: (1) "explicit statutoriy
condemnation of certain conduct and a general grant of jurisdiction to
enforce liabilities created by the statute";" and (2) "such considerations as the protection intended by the legislature and the ineffectiveness of existing remedies, administrative and judicial remedies, to fully
12358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
13 Id. at 179.

14 NYSE CONST. art. XIV, § 6.
1'5See, e.g., §§ 6(b) and 15A(b)(8) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78o-3(b)(8) (1970); CCH NASD MxeuAr. art. I, § 2(a), ff 1102; id.
art. III, § 1, 9 2151.
16358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 817 (1966).
17141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944).
18358 F.2d at 181.
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achieve that end.' 9 The court went on to state that a rule offered as
a basis for a private action would be most acceptable were it to
present a specific rather than a vague, general admonition. That is, it
should be "a substitute for regulation by the SEC itself" to impose
"an explicit [legal] duty unknown to the common law."2"
While indicating that it would not take the position that there
could never be a basis for implying a private right of action based on
an exchange or association rule, the court proceeded to express its belief
that there would not be, a fortiori, civil liability for violation of rules
prohibiting conduct which is "inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade."21 In the court's opinion, the scope of these rules
includes "unethical behavior which Congress could well not have intended to give rise to a legal claim"; 22 from this, the court found no
reason to believe that merely by requiring adoption of rules assuring
fair and equitable conduct, "Congress meant to impose a new legal
standard on members different from that long recognized by state
law."2" Accordingly, the court denied the plaintiff any cause of action,
holding that the NASD's general business conduct rule did not supply
an adequate basis for the implication of a private remedy.
An analysis of the post-Colonial Realty cases reveals that courts
have not been uniform in the application of the tests which that case
promulgates. Indeed First Securities represents the last in a series of
cases, decided by the Seventh Circuit, which has invoked the use of a
quite different set of standards.
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,24 arose
out of a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy for a bankrupt brokerage
firm. This case involved a claim by the trustee in bankruptcy against
Merrill Lynch for violation of rule 405 of the NYSE which requires
"due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer,
every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by a
member organization
. 25 Itwas alleged that the defendant had
allowed the president of the bankrupt brokerage firm to maintain cash
and margin accounts for the purpose of speculation without inquiring
into his financial responsibility or the source of his funds. The plaintiff
also claimed Merrill Lynch had allowed the speculation to continue
after it learned that the funds were those of customers and not the
bankrupt's own. Losses sustained in trading with defendant were said
to be the direct cause of the bankruptcy.
While the Buttrey decision did not involve an NASD rule, but
19 Id.
ld. at 182.
Id.at 183.
22
Id.at 182.

20
21

23

Id.

24410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1969).
25
Id. at 141.
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rather the NYSE's rule 405, the Seventh Circuit proceeded to discuss
the Colonial Realty opinion, evidently believing that the question of
the existence of a private cause of action under the NYSE's selfregulatory rule raised issues similar to those under the NASD rule.
Without explicitly rejecting the Colonial Realty opinion, the Buttrey
court ignored such factors as whether the self-regulatory rule imposed
a duty unknown at common law or could be viewed as a substitute
for SEC regulation. As to whether an NYSE rule might give rise to a
private cause of action, the court concluded:
The touchstone for determining whether or not the violation
of a particular rule is actionable should properly depend upon
its design "for the direct protection of investors." . . . Here

one of the functions of Rule 405 is to protect the public, so
that permitting a private action for its violation
is entirely
26
consistent with the purposes of the statute.
Having determined that permitting a private cause of action under
rule 405 would not be inconsistent with "the purposes of the statute, 2 7
the court went on to suggest what the elements of the proposed cause of
action would be. The court specifically did "not decide that an alleged
violation of rule 405 is per se actionable.

2

8

Although mere errors of judgment by defendant might not
support a federal cause of action, the facts alleged here are
tantamount to fraud on the bankrupt's customers, thus giving
rise to a private civil damage action. 9
In a case subsequent to Buttrey, Avern Trust v. Clarke,30 the
Seventh Circuit spoke again largely in terms of rules designed to
protect the public. Also again, a finding of fraud was directly relevant
to the court's disposition of the case. Indeed, the court stated that,
"Section 2 of Article III of the [NASD's] Rules of Fair Practice is
intended 'for the direct protection of investors,'" and citing its decision in Buttrey, concluded that the dismissal of the cause of action
based upon the suitability rule had been improper. It then proceeded,
however, to declare that the dismissal had not prejudiced the plaintiff's
case, in that the same suitability violation theory was incorporated
under the claim for violation of section 15 of the 1934 Act.31 Thus,
the court found that while a private cause of action does in fact exist
for violation of the NASD's suitability rule, the suitability violation
in that case was of such a nature as to be covered by one of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act.
26 Id. at 142 (citations omitted).

27Id.
28 1d.
29 Id.

at 143.
30415 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
31410 F.2d at 142.
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The language of Buttrey, Avern, and First Securities indicates
that a claim will be recognized for a violation of any NASD rule
intended for the protection of the public. The additional requirement
of fraudulent conduct has not yet been firmly established and has
been questioned by courts as well as commentators3 Such language
is broad enough to encompass all the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
This is just the indiscriminate fashioning of rules violations into torts
that Colonial Realty rejected.33
Integral to what the Second Circuit believed must form the basis
of a reasonable approach to civil liability for violations of NASD rules
is concern with the effect of that civil liability on the statutory scheme
of cooperative regulation and the appropriateness of judicially enforcing ethical standards. 4 Friendly's substitution test-that courts should
allow private recovery for violations of rules which substitute for or
play an integral part in SEC regulation-reflects these concerns and
leaves the courts allowing recovery in cases involving so-called legal
prohibitions and denying recovery in cases involving the ethical questions which do not lend themselves readily to judicial enforcement.
Under the Maloney Act35 of 1938 the promulgation and enforcement of rules designed to promote just and equitable principles of
trade in over-the-counter markets were committed to registered security
dealers associations.3 6 The powers of the SEC in regulation of overthe-counter markets have traditionally related primarily to fraudulent
activity and disclosure requirements. While the scope of SEC activity
has broadened since its inception in 1934, it remains true today that
one of the fundamental advantages of the cooperative regulatory
scheme is that the self-regulatory bodies can enforce ethical standards
37
above and beyond those that can be enforced as a matter of law.
32

Such was the interpretation placed on Buttrey by the federal district court in
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH Fho. SEc. L. REP. ff 92,748 (N.I). Ill. 1970). For an interpretation that
the existence of fraud was only sufficient and not necessary for the imposition of civil
liability, see Wolfson & Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of
Stock Exchange Rules, 58 CALF. L. REv. 1120, 1131 (1970).
33358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
34Id. at 181. For a discussion of these concerns as they relate to civil liability under
the NASD's suitability rule, see text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3, 78q, 78cc, 78ff (1970).
3
See Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability
Doctrine, 1965 DuxE L.J. 445, 466 [hereinafter cited as Mundheim, The Suitability
Doctrine].
37
See, e.g., Address by SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas, Bond Club of Hartford,
Connecticut, Jan. 7, 1938, quoted in T m
REPORT OF Ta SPECAL SxUY OF SEcuapxs
MARxETS OF a SECeImEs AwD EXCHANGE Cozr~xsslO , H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,

1st Sess., pt. 4, at 694-95 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. The Special
Study completed by the SEC in 1963 evidenced a new concern with formulating and
promoting professional standards of conduct. See SPEcIAL STUDY, pt. 1, at 159-62 (recommending that entry into the broker-dealer business be limited in order to insure
adequate service); Mundheim, The Suitability Doctrine, supra note 36, at 445-46. Even

full disclosure of relevant security information was considered to be inadequate for
investor protection. The major result of the Special Study was the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 78c, 781-o, 78o-3, 78p, 78t, 78w, 78ff (1970).
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All NASD rules play a significant role in the regulation of the
securities industry, but only some NASD rules should be thought of
as substituting for SEC regulation-namely, those designed to prevent
fraud. Under the Colonial Realty test, these rules will assume legal
significance, while those ethical NASD rules aimed at promoting just
and equitable principles of trade will not.
This distinction between legal rules which do substitute for SEC
regulation and ethical rules which do not is, of course, a vague one.
In ColonialRealty, Judge Friendly offered a further test to distinguish
those rules which would give rise to a private cause of action. "The
case for implication [of a private right of action] would be strongest,"
he said, "when the rule imposes an explicit duty unknown to the common law."88 General standards of adequate service have traditionally
been within the province of the common law and therefore would not
give rise to a private right of action. On the other hand, rules which
establish specific procedures designed to prevent fraud-section 27
of the Rules of Fair Practice, for example-create duties unknown to
the common law and are therefore proper bases for civil liability.89
I[.

APPLICATION OF THE

Colonial Realty

TEST TO

THE SUITABILITY RuLE

Section 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale, or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for
such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by
such customer as to his other security holdings and as to his
financial situation and needs4 0
The Colonial Realty approach allows for the distinction of a standard
of professional service or conduct from other rules of the NASD, like
section 27, which can be properly interpreted as establishing procedures designed to prevent fraud. Application of a simplified protection-of-the-public theory as promulgated in First Securities, would impose civil liability for violation of any of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice including the suitability rule. Unfortunate consequences could
follow.
Although the 1964 Amendments increased SEC control over persons associated with
a broker-dealer and gave the Commission the power to establish rules among nonmembers of the NASD, they did not alter the scheme whereby the NASD had primary
responsibility for promoting high professional standards among its own members. 15

U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(8)-(10) (1970).

38 358 F.2d at 182.
89
Violations of a third category of rules-general rules prohibiting fraudulent
activity-would not give rise to civil liability under Friendly's test, if they do not
violate a duty unknown at common law. But violations of these rules would undoubtedly
give rise to civil liability under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.
4
0 CCH NASD MANUAL art. III, § 2, 1 2152.
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One of the concerns of the SEC's Special Study of the Securities
Markets4 ' was the lack of initiative on the part of the NASD in certain
problem areas.42 While it commended the NASD for formulating a
general suitability rule it called for further definition of content and
more effective enforcement. 4 3 It is significant that the Commission
recommended that the NASD take the responsibility for refining its
rule and that the Commission has the power to review the disciplinary
decisions and rule changes made by the NASD.
The SEC relies on the NASD to define the NASD rule while reserving to itself the power to review interpretations of the rule. This
emphasis on cooperation between industry and government is not
without good reason. The securities industry has come to regard itself
as a profession but is still essentially a selling business.4 5 The advising
services offered by broker-dealers are not inseparable from their interest in sales. A major problem, then, is to attempt to coordinate the
selling and advising activities in some manner which provides adequate
service to customers. Few people outside the industry are in a position
to judge the adequacy of the advice given, or even to set a standard on
which to judge adequacy." Indeed the SEC's own version of the suitthat a
ability rule does not define "reasonable grounds to believe"
47
itself.
"suitability"
define
it
does
nor
suitable,
is
security
The difficulty courts have in dealing with measures of adequate
investment service may be illustrated by the development of the
prudent-man rule. The rule relates to a trustee's responsibility for
investing trust funds. As originally stated in Harvard College v.
Amory, 48 the legal obligation of the trustee was to exercise sound
discretion, to emulate prudent men in the disposition of funds, with
an eye to both income and risk. In the course of time, however, the
relatively flexible rule became rigid. Courts made a distinction between
speculation and investment. They concentrated on the riskiness of
individual securities, in disregard of their potential for producing
income and their place in an investor's securities holdings as a whole.
At times trustees have been forbidden to purchase new securities,
since there was no past history on which to judge riskiness. The rule
now appears to be an obstacle to investments based on portfolio
theory, in which relatively risky securities with high earning potential
41

Note 37 supra.
SPEacAL ST DY, supra note 37, pt. 4, at 669.
id.
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(g)-(h), (j) (1970).
45
See Mundheim, The Suitability Doctrine,supra note 36, at 446-47; Ss'CiTr STuov,
supra note 37, pt. 1, at 240-42.
46 Cf. Hoblin, A Stock Broker's Implied Liability to its Customer for Violation of
a Rule of a Registered Stock Exchange, 39 FoPDHAm L. REV. 253, 269-70 (1970).
42
43

47 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1972).
48 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
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are balanced against practically risk-free securities, to produce the
highest potential earnings at any given level of risk."
In light of the role of precedent and the limitation of courts to
case-by-case development, judicial enforcement of the suitability rule
might result in a similarly rigid and unrealistic test. This is a significant
danger in judicially enforcing standards of professional conduct in
the securities area. A very closely related danger is the crippling of
the scheme of cooperative regulation. The heavy hand of judicial enforcement might well destroy any initiative the NASD may have in
attempting to define suitability. Any tentative guideline issued might
be adopted by the courts as the basis for civil liability and become
hardened into law. Fears of civil actions have apparently hindered the
formation of more precise guidelines in the past.50
Suitability is a vague concept offering little guidance to the people
it affects. Hence a professionally unsound recommendation, with regard
to what a court or jury considers a suitable security, is entirely possible. If liability were to attach in such a case, multiple claims may
afflict the industry, for any investment which loses money often looks
unreasonable to the customer. 5 ' Civil liability for violation of specific
procedures prescribed by the NASD to prevent fraud poses no such
dangers. Here there is little discretion involved and any inadvertent
violation could be considered negligent. It would not be unfair to hold
a broker-dealer liable for its carelessness, particularly where it is possible to determine valid claims based on specific requirements.
III.

CONCLSION

The approach the Seventh Circuit has taken in granting federal
judicial remedies for violations of NASD rules is unfortunate. In
using the simplified protection-of-the-public doctrine it has opened the
door to claims based on any of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. In
contrast to this, the Second Circuit method for determining which
NASD rules will serve as grounds for civil actions enables the courts
to separate mere standards of professional conduct from rules designed
to prevent fraud. The securities laws are designed to protect the public, but are designed in a certain way. Formulation of professional
ethics for over-the-counter broker-dealers was committed to the NASD,
the private regulator, subject to certain controls of the SEC, the government regulator. This system of private effort with limited public
intervention appears necessary to create a system of ethics aimed at
guaranteeing professional service in a selling business.
If a time comes when the federal courts decide that the statutory
49 Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REv. 603, 614-16 (1970).
For an excellent presentation of the portfolio theory, see Cohen, The Suitability Rule
and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971).
50 Mundheiin, The Suitability Doctrine, supra note 36, at 463.
51 Cf. Belliveau, Discretion or Indiscretion,INST. Iw., Aug. 1972, at 69, 66.
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scheme is inadequate to guarantee professional service and that civil
liability must be implied to protect the investing public, the use of an
analysis based on the Friendly criteria will point out that they are
adopting mere standards of conduct. The responsibility for developing
these standards in a flexible and realistic manner will fall directly on
the courts. They should be aware that they will be doing more than
creating a claim for relief for violation of professional duties; they will
be creating the duties themselves.
While the result of the First Securities case appears correct, since
the rule involved in that case was designed to prevent fraud, the Seventh Circuit's approach is unfortunate. The more careful method
adopted by the Second Circuit in Colonial Realty is to be preferred.

